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From Queensberry Rules to Argumentative Theory: 
A Review of Mercier & Sperber’s  
The Enigma of Reason 
 
 
Ira Noveck 
 
 
RESUMEN 
Esta recensión de The Enigma of Reason de Mercier y Sperber presenta partes de la 
historia reciente (y a veces personal) de la literatura sobre historia del Razonamiento con 
el objetivo de subrayar hasta qué punto es innovadora su teoría de la argumentación y 
proporcionar a la vez el telón de fondo para tres comentarios. El primer comentario 
aborda el punto de vista deflacionista de los autores sobre la realización de inferencias: se 
presentan las capacidades deductivas como algo tan común y corriente que no se pueden 
distinguir de otras intuiciones de orden inferior. Discrepo de esta caracterización y des-
cribo cinco líneas de investigación positiva para mostrar que la realización fundamental 
de inferencias ofrece regularidades en la conducta que las separa de otros géneros de in-
ferencia discutidos en el contexto del Razonamiento. El segundo comentario se ocupa de 
asuntos relacionados experimentalmente, tales como el tipo de predicciones que se siguen 
de la teoría de la argumentación y que la harían falsificable (específicamente ¿qué pro-
blemas de razonamiento se beneficiarían de la deliberación?). El tercer comentario abor-
da la noción de explicaciones. Los laboratorios de razonamiento han sido reticentes desde 
hace mucho tiempo a incorporar las explicaciones de los participantes a sus informes por 
razones filosóficas, empíricas e históricas. Los investigadores se beneficiarían si la teoría 
de la argumentación clarificase mejor qué tipo de explicaciones son beneficiosas para los 
propósitos experimentales. 
 
PALABRAS CLAVE: lógica mental, historia de la psicología, deducción, imaginería cerebral del Razona-
miento, falsabilidad, predictibilidad.  
 
ABSTRACT 
This review of Mercier and Sperber’s The Enigma of Reason presents some recent 
(and at times personal) history of the Reasoning literature in order to underline how in-
novative their Argumentative Theory is and to provide the backdrop to three comments. 
The first comment addresses their deflationary view of deductive inference-making -- 
which presents deductive abilities as so run-of-the-mill that they are not differentiable 
from other lower-order intuitions. I take issue with this characterization and describe five 
strands of  positive research showing that fundamental deductive inference-making af-
fords regularities in behavior that sets it apart from other kinds of  inference-making dis-
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cussed in the context of  Reasoning. The second comment is concerned with experimen-
tally related issues, such as the sort of predictions that follow from Argumentative Theo-
ry and that would make it falsifiable (specifically, which reasoning problems would 
benefit from deliberation?). The third comment addresses the notion of explanations. Rea-
soning labs have long been reticent to incorporate participants’ explanations into their 
accounts for philosophical, empirical and historical reasons. Researchers would benefit if 
the Argumentative Theory were to better clarify what sort of explanations are beneficial 
for experimental purposes.  
 
KEYWORDS: Mental Logic, History of Psychology, Deduction, Neuroimagery of Reasoning, Falsifiabil-
ity, Predictability. 
 
 
As a graduate student in the 1980’s, I was a member of one of the 
reasoning labs that Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber mention early in the 
book. My labmates and I helped Marty Braine [see Braine & O’Brien, 
(1998)] develop his Mental Logic approach, which made the straightfor-
ward claim that there are content-free schemas of reasoning that are logical 
in nature. Lance Rips (1994) made a similar proposal. In both programs, 
modus ponens (if p then q;p//therefore, q) and disjunction elimination (p or q;not-
q//therefore, p) were two of a handful of schemas that were proposed to 
automatically arise when the appropriate premise sets were made availa-
ble. Overall, logical terms, such as and, if or or, were at the heart of each 
schema. The theory also featured a reasoning program that made predic-
tions about the order in which certain inferences would be made (regard-
less of the order of the premises). The identified schemas were 
distinguished from other logical arguments. For example, modus tollens (if 
p then q;not-q//therefore, not-p) was not considered part of Braine’s Mental 
Logic because it requires multiple steps (starting with suppose p as part of 
a reductio ad absurdum) and requires strategic thinking (making it more 
prone to error). This approach obviously held logical form as a feature of 
reasoning, even if it did not hold as lofty a place as it does in an Aristoteli-
an program. Aside from Mental Logic there were two other major theories 
of reasoning vying for superiority at the time.  
Adherents of the Mental Models approach (developed by Phil John-
son-Laird and Ruth Byrne) did not reject outright the import of logic in 
reasoning but placed a greater emphasis on the internal representations 
(the mental models) that allow reasoning to occur. Johnson-Laird and his 
colleagues [for a summary, see Johnson-Laird (2006)] argued that people 
use logical (as well as relational) terms to set up a mental model after 
which one can do deductive work; reasoners could then evaluate a con-
clusion by determining whether or not their internal model provides it. 
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While Phil Johnson-Laird and Marty Braine and their respective al-
lies tangled, Jonathan Evans and his allies took a more pessimistic posi-
tion by arguing that participants hardly paid attention to logical rules in 
reasoning tasks in lieu of non-logical features. According to Evans (1989), 
participants are primarily attracted to superficial features of a problem, 
such as the matching between a problem’s premises and conclusion or the 
believability of a conclusion when evaluating syllogisms, rather than to the 
logical relations provided by the premises. 
All three groups would box it out through outcomes on subtle vari-
ations from a set of reasoning tasks, many of which were originated by 
Peter Wason. The field of (the Psychology of) Reasoning, while plod-
ding, was a lively if idiosyncratic corner of the cognitive world that in-
spired exceptional amounts of theory-making about rationality along 
with debates and, of course, data. Each group would provide its evidence 
to support its own approach and, when possible, each would present 
counterevidence against the other. In retrospect, none of the adversaries 
changed another’s mind (although members of the next generation were 
arguably more flexible). Of course, the field did not remain focused on 
those three accounts of reasoning. As described in the Enigma of Reason, 
other theories –– some of which were inspired by evolutionary concepts 
[e.g. see Cosmides (1989)] –– would make prominent appearances.  
No one in the Mental Logic and Mental Models camps, which were 
especially unreceptive to one another, anticipated that the folks defending 
superficial biases would eventually pull ahead. But that is exactly what 
happened. With the increasing influence of Kahenman and Tversky’s ap-
proach in a neighboring discipline –– i.e. probabilistic reasoning and deci-
sion making –– along with their ever-growing catalogue of biases, Evan’s 
heuristic and biases account of deductive reasoning –– appeared to win 
out.  The field of reasoning (viewed with a wide lens) increasingly em-
phasized, not how logical we are but, how susceptible we are to fallacies. 
Naturally, the view that logic, or other normative rules, can serve as a 
source of reasoning lost its exalted status in this corner of Psychology. To 
maintain any hope for rationality in reasoning, one would have to resort 
to a dual system in which one system is instinctively heuristical and at 
risk of violating normative reasoning and another is more reflective and 
potentially normative. This is arguably the most endorsed account of 
reasoning today [see Kahneman (2011)], which echoes those by Evans 
(2003) and Sloman (1996). This is the approach that Hugo and Dan find 
unsatisfactory and that leads them to develop their alternative. 
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It bears mentioning that, at least as far as my old lab was con-
cerned, these debates generated scores, if not hundreds, of task variants 
investigating propositional reasoning, the Selection task, the THOG task, 
the 2-4-6 task, the Linda problem and many others (each of the tasks 
that I mention here can be found on the internet). I add that participants 
carried out these tasks by pen and paper while following the instruction 
to provide a one- or two-sentence-long justification for their response at 
the bottom of the page. Interestingly, we experimenters would look at 
these explanations and then summarily ignore them. Frankly, when I was 
a newcomer I didn’t understand why we would do that when we were al-
so aware that we would not report the justifications. The answer from 
the more senior members of the lab was that these justifications were re-
quested so that subjects would take their task seriously and that is it. 
However, the better answer eventually became clearer to me, which was 
that it is common knowledge that justifications could not be counted on 
[Nisbett and Wilson (1977)]. In retrospect, this practice of dismissing 
justifications was at least partly due to a post-Structuralist suspicion of 
counting on subjects’ immediate impressions. These sorts of data were 
disdained by Behaviorists and the new cognitive psychology was vigilant-
ly avoiding it as well.  The theory we were defending or confronting mat-
tered most of all along with data that could be properly crunched. It also 
bears mentioning that we were aware, at least anecdotally, that one la-
boratory in Kansas had noticed that college students handled Wason’s 
Selection Task better as members of a collaborative group than as indi-
viduals [see Moshman & Geil (1998)], but the potential of this curious 
fact was just that and also remained neglected. 
The steady deflation of logic as an organizing (or prominent) fea-
ture of reasoning does not mean that deductive processes lost their luster 
among researchers. Interest in deduction certainly remains. In fact, some 
of the older debates have moved interestingly to neuroimaging, where 
mental logicians and mental modellers initially made different predictions 
about the neural structures that ought to support deductive reasoning. In 
my view, this initial debate has been fruitful for the neurological litera-
ture. In fact, much headway has been made with respect to both deduc-
tive reasoning and bias (perhaps not the myside bias) and the way these 
two features of reasoning interact in the brain. So, I disagree with some 
recent comments that Hugo and Dan made –– during one of their recent 
interviews [Boyd (2018)] –– in which they said that “the impact of neu-
roscientific methods has been much more limited so far” with respect to 
the study of reasoning. In fairness, Hugo and Dan were politely correct-
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ing the interviewer’s assumption that neuroscience was the only worth-
while form of empirical evidence to consider, but the upshot is that their 
comment does leave the impression that there are no reliable data to ac-
crue from neuroscience, or more specifically neuroimaging. I will discuss 
these later. Deductive abilities are also topics for several developmental 
labs that highlight babies’ abilities to detect logical relations; for example, 
one recently published study provides evidence showing how even pre-
verbal infants (12-month-olds) can detect violations of disjunction elimi-
nation [see Cesana-Arotti et al. (2018)]. 
 
 
Why it is Relevant to Consider the Recent History of the Psychology of Reasoning 
 
I share this extensive background for two reasons. One is that it 
helps explain the extent to which Hugo and Dan’s theory (which I will 
not summarize here) aims to radically reshape the reasoning literature. By 
viewing reasoning through an evolutionary social lens while explaining 
how modules and representations figure into reasoning, they have a) 
brought justifications or reasons out of the shadows and repurposed 
them and have; b) furthered the demise of the stance that views logical 
inference making as exceptional. While logical deductions may emerge 
through a modular inference generator, Hugo and Dan claim, these be-
come prominent as a means of evaluating arguments. Logical deductions 
are not a feature of solitary “intellective” reasoning nor are they pro-
cessed in a content-free manner.  
The other reason I share this much background is that it provides a 
basis for my comments, which are threefold. First, unlike Hugo and Dan 
who despair of the lack of progress in reasoning [p. 48] and who see 
such a lack as a springboard for considering other approaches, I view the 
Reasoning literature more optimistically because it offers enough regular-
ity so as to provide the basis for a solid cognitive science. The Reasoning 
literature has provided a plethora of robust effects –– some showing that 
human beings are not normative reasoners and others showing an ability 
to carry out deductions –– that need to be reconciled with theories and 
accounted for. Given the prominence attributed to the heuristics and 
failures of human reasoning (in the book and elsewhere), it does pay to 
emphasize what a content-free view of logical inference has yielded, 
which are robust findings showing the extent to which certain basic de-
ductions are carried out automatically and reliably. This leads me to ad-
dress Hugo and Dan’s deflationary view of logical inferences, which sees 
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deductive inference-making as so non-unique that it is undifferentiable 
from multiple other reasoning processes. My second comment concerns 
ways to falsify the theory. While I am a fan (and in the interest of full 
disclosure, I have been privileged to see Hugo and Dan progressively 
develop this theory –– albeit from afar –– for about 10 years), I think it 
would behoove the Argumentative Theory to anticipate how the theory 
can be falsified, or delimited.  The third comment addresses the notion 
of explanations, which is obviously central to their account. As I de-
scribed earlier, labs have long been reticent to incorporate participants’ 
explanations into their papers for deep philosophical, empirical and his-
torical reasons, so it should not be surprising that reasoning researchers 
would remain cautious in treating explanations as an independent or de-
pendent variable. I will describe how future investigations would benefit 
if the Argumentative Theory were to better clarify the borderline be-
tween explanations that are considered evaluable (the sort that are worth 
attending to, thus putting them at the center of deliberative reasoning) 
and those explanations that do not count. While I think it is clear to Hu-
go and Dan how one would operationalize explanations as part of an ex-
perimental paradigm, it is less obvious to me (and I suspect to other old-
time reasoning researchers), despite the book’s numerous examples. 
 
 
Preliminaries 
 
Before starting on the more substantial portions of this commen-
tary, I have to say that it is not an easy task to take a stand with respect 
to such an original theory. For one thing, while the theory addresses the 
Psychology of Reasoning, an area that has been around as part of modern 
cognitive psychology for 60 plus years (meaning there is a lot of ground to 
cover), the book points out that researchers tend to persist in their wrong-
headed intuitions as part of a counter-productive (myside) bias. Now, if I 
defend a classical position (which I do in part here), I ostensibly become 
one of those people –– described frequently in the book –– who (refuses 
to change and) persists in sticking to some wrong-headed theory, making 
me “orthodox” (which sounds strange to me). I am aware that this charge 
can be easily applied to anyone who aims to defend at least some data 
that are aligned with traditional views. While this rhetorical tack is unfor-
tunate because it puts me in an untenable position, I will charge ahead 
nevertheless. 
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Reports on the Death of Spontaneous Deductions Appear Exaggerated 
 
One of the theory’s claims is that inferences with logical import are 
so run-of-the-mill that they sit side-by-side inconspicuously with other 
low-level inferences. Hugo and Dan write [p. 166] that logic itself is “a 
heuristic tool” and that setting up a syllogism is a kind of idealization that 
accentuates logical relations and ignores all the features of thinking that we 
are typically contending with. Lower-intuitions, whether logical or not, in-
habit our immediate impressions and it is only among higher-order intui-
tions, a kind of metacognitive ability, that logical features filter in. This 
approach, while very attractive, does not do justice to a lot of data, which 
show just how immediate and prominent logical relations jump out to par-
ticipants. Just to be clear about how I approach their claims, I begin with a 
true story about wet floors that arose while I was preparing this piece.  
One recent morning on a relatively dry day, I went out to our small 
courtyard and noticed that the floor was wet (to the point that there were 
a few banana-sized puddles) and that the water seemed to originate from 
the courtyard’s faucet. Once on the ground, the water seemed to going 
down a slight incline to a drain two meters away. The courtyard’s faucet 
was indeed dripping water but at a very slow pace, hardly fast enough to 
merit the large collection of  water that I was looking at. I tried to resolve 
this quandary. Ultimately, I asked myself  whether my son might have 
opened the faucet earlier in the morning (my wife was away so it could 
not have been her and my daughter is in University abroad, so she’s no 
longer home). This was followed by my asking myself  whether a stranger 
had opened the faucet (which would mean he or she entered through a 
locked door from the street). Before I knew it, I was making my way to my 
office to check on my computer (is it still there?). It was where I left it.   
This reasoning “problem” was triggered by an event that I tried to 
resolve. This description fits with the Argumentative Theory because my 
quandary begins with intuitions that are generated by a conclusion (an 
excessively wet floor on an otherwise dry day). Note that of  the four in-
tuitions, glossed as (1a) through (1d) below, two (1a) and (1c) are deduc-
tive in character and the two others (1b) and (1d) are more inductive: 
 
1.    (a)    If the ordinary slow-dripping faucet alone is the cause of  
               the water on the floor, the puddles would not be so large. 
 
               The puddles are indeed large. 
 
               Therefore, the ordinary slow-dripping faucet alone is not  
                the cause of the puddles. 
8                                                                                            Ira Noveck 
teorema XXXVIII/1, 2019, pp. 00-00 
        (b)    Someone must have opened the faucet (recently) 
 
        (c)    It was my son or me 
 
                I know it wasn’t me 
 
                Therefore, I’ll ask my son (but I’m pretty sure it wasn’t him) 
 
         (d)    Did someone break in? Is there a sign of that? 
 
Now, if  I am understanding the theory and nomenclature properly, we 
make inferences (as readily as we breathe) and the contents of  the inner 
speech (that I rendered explicit above) are intuitions that emerge through 
metacognitive activity, a “cognition about cognition”, with respect to our 
capacity to evaluate our own mental state [page 65]. Importantly, these 
sorts of  intuitions are not the result of  a general processing mechanism 
but of  a set of  specific modular ones –– such as a protective papa module 
that is on the prowl for predators and that is keenly aware of  suspicious 
changes in the environment, a physics module (comprising knowledge 
about water and rates of  evaporation) and, arguably, a mindreading 
module too. Importantly, the inferences in (1a) through (1d) at this point 
would not be considered reasoning. The series above becomes reasoning 
when I use an intuitive reasoning module to justify my paranoia when I 
talk about my observations later. Until then, these reflections work side-
by-side with other modules, on my representation. These remain just in-
ferences in my head similar to those we use unconsciously all the time. 
This is where I would like to pause. Note that the theory views logical in-
ference-making as nothing more than perceptions and other immediate 
sensations. In light of  the kind of  work that has emerged from the Rea-
soning literature since the 1980’s at least, this view strikes me as some-
what skewed. Can it be that disjunction elimination –– implicitly carried 
out as I look solitarily at a few puddles of  water –– is so unremarkable in 
the panorama of  human thought? Fundamental deductive inference-
making, at least when part of  comprehension and reasoning tasks, 
prompts much regularity and this ought to set it apart from other sorts 
of  inference-making. Below I describe five regularities about deductive 
inference-making that make me doubt such a strong deflationary claim.  
All the examples below come from tasks –– inspired in one way or an-
other by the reasoning literature –– that involve spontaneous deductive 
inference-making.  
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First of  all, as far as comprehension goes, we –– as researchers –– 
can predict with confidence the rate at which logical forms are carried out 
correctly by ordinary adults regardless of  language. The form in (1a) re-
flects modus tollens, which normally prompts correct performance at a rate 
of  about 60% in straightforward propositional reasoning tasks and (1c) 
represents disjunction elimination, which more reliably prompts subjects to 
produce logical outcomes. Though not represented in my water-on-the-
ground example, modus ponens –– regardless of  content –– is probably the 
most reliable. While I am not familiar with work investigating a partici-
pant’s confidence while evaluating various argument forms, it does ap-
pear that performance is linked to the cognitive effort each requires (as 
can be seen by the relative success in carrying out modus ponens compared 
to modus tollens).  
Second, we know that, independently of  specific content, partici-
pants generate logical inferences automatically as soon as two relevant 
premises are presented [Lea (1995); Bonnefond et al. (2013)]. For exam-
ple, consider a case in which a participant reads about a story character 
who utters a conditional under his breath (2a) and, two sentences later, 
processes (2b): 
 
2.    (a)    “If I can’t find another shirt to wear on my date tonight,”  
               George thought, “then I had better find a needle.”. 
 
       (b)    But George couldn’t find another shirt to wear because 
                all of his other shirts were dirty. 
 
Under these circumstances, in which the pre-requisites for carrying out 
modus ponens are satisfied, associates to the word needle (e.g. thread) become 
activated more quickly compared to cases in which (2b) was replaced 
with (2b’), where the pre-requisites for modus ponens are no longer ful-
filled: 
 
2.    (b’)    George realized that he had better figure out which shirt  
                to wear soon because he was late. 
 
This means that research has shown that deductive inferences emerge ra-
ther spontaneously (in tasks that capture subtle on-line processing).  
Third, we can predict which collection of  neural structures are reli-
ably activated when carrying out deductions [for a meta-analysis, see 
Prado et al. (2011)]. This consists of  a left fronto-parietal network that 
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prominently includes the left precentral gyrus, the left medial frontal gy-
rus, the left precuneus, and the left inferior frontal gyrus. By the way, one 
of  those studies that supports this regularity was based on work that 
Dan and I started doing 20 years ago and that evolved only recently into 
an imaging study [Prado et al. (2015)].  
Fourth, and relatedly, these neural areas that appear to support de-
ductive inferences are impartial to logical form, meaning they are activat-
ed with propositional reasoning as well as with predicate reasoning [see 
Reverberi et al. (2012)]. The same holds for content. One study [Canessa 
et al. (2005)] provided two kinds of  Selection Tasks (a social contract ver-
sion and a more classical arbitrary version) and found that reasoning with 
both kinds of  content prompted activity in the typical parietal-frontal areas 
when compared to control problems (with the social contract cases activat-
ing further areas, in the Right hemisphere).  Deductions at one point were 
thought to be linked to language-support structures (due to the overlap-
ping activity in the Inferior Frontal Gyrus), but some clever experimenta-
tion later showed that deductive activity can be distinguished from 
syntactic operations [Monti et al. (2009)].  
Finally, deductive inferences can be distinguished from non-logical 
influences in neural studies (remember that logical inferences are as-
sumed to operate side-by-side with non-logical inferences in the Argu-
mentative Theory). We know that conditions that were designed to elicit 
biases among participants in a predicate reasoning task do not prompt 
patterns of activation that overlap with the reasoning network [Reverberi 
et al. (2012)]. We also know that right frontal areas (the Right Dorsal 
Lateral Prefrontal Cortex) are activated when there is a conflict between 
logical versus heuristic types of  information. For example, Prado & 
Noveck (2007) used one of  Evans’s tasks to create cases where matching 
would come in direct conflict with the evaluation of  a logical rule (con-
sider the case in which the conditional rule If  there is an H then there is not 
a square is tested with an exemplar consisting of  an image showing an H-
in-a-circle; the two shapes do not match). This trial’s true response is hard-
er to derive than trials that show closer matches between the rule and ex-
emplar (consider If  there is an H then there is a square followed by the image 
of  an H-in-a-square). The more mismatching the trial requires, the more 
one finds activity in frontal areas in the right hemisphere. This finding is 
consistent with other cases in which there are conflicts between deduc-
tive information and other low-level sorts of  information, such as the 
belief  bias [Goel & Dolan (2003)]. 
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I have chosen these cases highlighting the automaticity and ubiquity 
of  logical inferences along with their neural support, not only because 
they have become part of  the corpus of  work carried out by experts on 
the Psychology of  Reasoning but, because they come from tasks that call 
for spontaneous deductions. Now, where do they fit in the Argumenta-
tive Theory? I think Hugo and Dan would agree that none of  these cases 
reflect reasoning (intuitions about reasons) as they described, which 
“consists in attending to reasons for adopting new conclusions” [p. 52]. If  
an experimenter asked participants why they chose “true” to an image of  
H-in-a-circle when provided If  H then not square, they would probably be 
mystified by the question. It follows that these cases of  deduction are 
more akin to inference because they involve the extraction of  new infor-
mation and across a wide range of  circumstances. What module processes 
them? They arguably result from a linguistic comprehension mechanism (a 
“modular comprehension procedure that exploits, without representing 
them, relevance-based regularities in verbal comprehension”, see p. 122).  
Note though that many of  these cases are not your run-of-the-mill ver-
bal situations because the relationships drawn by the experiment are arbi-
trary (see the last example linking letters and shapes). All of  these 
examples involve some relatively low-level activity that hinges on the 
meaning of  a logical word, such as if, and what is being observed as par-
ticipants arrive at some answer.  
Yet, these low-level inferences –– which would have to be consid-
ered by Hugo and Dan as something akin to the perceptual inferences in 
illusions as they discussed –– produce regularities with respect to out-
comes in both behavioral and neuroimagery experiments. That is what 
makes it hard to view these deductions as run-of-the-mill inferences. 
They merit scientific attention on their own. They afford specific behav-
iors and reactions. This is why I hesitate to endorse the Argumentative 
Theory’s strong deflationary view of  logical inference.  
On a related issue, I wonder what it would take to convince Dan 
and Hugo that these data argue against their deflationary account. It may 
be bracing to say that x (which could be anything from modus ponens to 
metaphor) is nothing special (“nothing to see here other than the mind 
at work, move on”), but how does one then ignore the overwhelming 
positive evidence indicating that x automatically prompts characteristic 
trains of thoughts. It’s hard to know what criteria to adopt in order to 
accept this or any deflationary claim, unless relevant concomitant data 
can be accounted for in some other way. According to the more tradi-
tional view (that does assume that content-free disjunctions and condi-
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tionals have status in human thinking), we could at least prove ourselves 
wrong. When we were defending Mental Logic, we emphasized that logi-
cal terms, such as if, or, and and not, are found in all languages and they 
appear to do the same thing universally. That has largely held up (even 
while keeping in mind the non-monotonic cases, which call for further 
explanation). At present, I see no reason to abandon these fundamental 
claims. Even if one treats the effects related to if as some form of con-
ventional implicature [see p. 163], at the very least it appears to provide 
gains in information in a way that other conventional implicatures do not 
(for example, consider the word but, which prompts inferences, but does 
not impact the underlying logical form).  
 
How Can the Theory be Wrong? 
 
One of  the strengths of  the Argumentative theory is that its novel 
perspective provides new data and empirical predictions. As an experi-
mentalist, this is what I find especially attractive. One class of  prediction 
is that collaborative reasoning should generally lead to improved perfor-
mance on Reasoning tasks and this has been demonstrated with, among 
other reasoning problems, Wason’s Selection Task, the bat-and-ball prob-
lem, and the disjunctive reasoning task [see Trouche et al. (2014)]. In these 
experimental exercises that Hugo has pioneered, authors have been careful 
not to promise too much, which is a good thing. This can be seen in 
Trouche et al (2014), p. 1969, who wrote about their set of  experiments 
showing that collaborative reasoning led to improved performance: 
 
This is an important demonstration of sound argumentative competence, in 
line with the predictions of, for instance, the argumentative theory of rea-
soning [Mercier & Sperber (2011)]. However, it is clear as well that the con-
ditions of demonstrability have to be well respected for this to be the case.  
 
This is a good start, but it would be helpful, in my view, to go further. 
What are the general conditions for the theory to be predictive about de-
liberative processes in solving reasoning problems? Is it limited to a cer-
tain well-prescribed set of  tasks? As far as I can tell, there seems to be a 
distinction to be made between, on the one hand, tasks in which heuris-
tic biases seem to compete with normative information (like the Lawyer-
Engineer problem), in which case the mere mention of  one or the other 
(the base-rate or stereotype information) appears to prompt improved per-
formance [see Obrecht & Cheney (2016)] and, on the other hand, tasks in 
which there is a working-out of a normativizing rule (e.g. the Wason Selec-
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tion Task). In the base-rate case, it seems to be a question of  making rel-
evant features salient and once a participant is reminded of, say, the im-
portance of  base-rates performance begins to improve. In cases like the 
Wason Selection Task or the Double Disjunctions riddle or the Bat-and-
Ball problem, there is some computation that needs to be worked out, 
despite the fact that the relevant evidence might be hard to appreciate 
immediately. Not all reasoning problems are alike. Based on the distinc-
tion I just made, for example, one would expect deliberation to improve 
performance on the THOG task pretty readily because performance 
with this task (which asks participants to classify four arbitrary figures 
based on a rule concerning a figure’s shape and color) would profit from 
having participants share, store and interact over some hard-to-track de-
tails. I am less clear what would happen on the Taxi-Cab problem, which 
involves recognizing base-rates while working out conditional probabili-
ties. I am not sure what would happen on the Linda problem either; that 
problem requires participants to detect nested probabilities while also ap-
preciating the problem-giver’s intention. The book presented a Sudoku 
puzzle (a very difficult one that I was pleased to complete); are we to un-
derstand that (inexperienced) Sudoku players would not work better 
through collaboration because it involves discovering procedures? It 
would be useful to the theory (and the community of  researchers inter-
ested in the theory) to make more precise predictions so that future ex-
perimentalists can prepare better experiments. This much would 
strengthen the theory. 
 
When Do Explanations Become Reliable Sources of  Data? 
 
There is a rich strain of  studies showing just how unreliable imme-
diate explanations can be. My favorite examples of  such phenomena 
come from split-brain studies where information is provided to eccentric 
areas of  a participant’s visual field so that the information is isolated as it is 
coded by each hemisphere. Consider work from Gazzaniga who would 
present two images –– one at a time –– to each hemisphere consecutively 
while asking patients to choose an associate –– among four options –– for 
each; such a patient’s justifications incorporate the two chosen associates 
into a single (often humorous) post-hoc account. For example, in one 
trial described by Cooney and Gazzaniga (2003), the right hemisphere 
would be shown a snowed-in house and the left hand would choose (ap-
propriately) a photo of  a shovel; then the left hemisphere would be 
shown a chicken claw and the right hand would choose (appropriately) a 
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photo of  a chicken shed. Once the two associated photos have been 
chosen (and are now available to both hemispheres), one split-brain pa-
tient justified her responses by saying that “the chicken goes with the 
claw and the shovel is to clean out the chicken shed” (my italics). The patient 
spontaneously invented a link between the two chosen pictures without 
realizing whence came the choice of  shovel. Cooney and Gazzaniga 
(2003) write that “the human brain has a unique capacity to reflexively 
formulate causal theories about why events occur.” I see this as support 
for the Argumentative Theory because it shows how scenes serve as 
conclusions and explanations are built (and often in an ad hoc manner), 
based on the limited resources applied.  
With the advent of  Argumentative Theory, one is asked, not to es-
chew justifications but, to take them seriously as variables. How is an ex-
perimentalist to manipulate these? I suppose one can view justifications 
as being on a spectrum, from reflexive to deliberative. Another way to 
appreciate justifications is more vertical, from lower-order intuitions to 
metacognitive higher-order intuitions before becoming the source of  de-
liberation and proper reasoning. While looking at the panorama of  ex-
periments that use explanations (in one form or another), it is not clear 
to me how to put proper sources of  deliberation in play. Given a histori-
cal reluctance to rely on justifications in reasoning research, it would be 
helpful to current researchers to know the conditions under which the 
theory considers justifications acceptable (or not). One way to get a 
sense of  good practices is through published work, but that does not 
provide clear guidance. 
In one lovely paper that Hugo co-authored, Trouche et al. (2016) 
show that people are more vigilant to arguments that come from others 
as opposed to themselves. There, a normative logical argument (e.g. to 
recognize that “No apples are organic” entails “Some apples are not or-
ganic”) becomes deliberative when the participant is confronted with the 
entailment (“Apples are fruit, so if  no apples are organic, at least some 
fruits are not organic”) as having come from “a previous participant.” 
This experiment operationalizes the idea that internal logical inferences 
(entailments) count as reasoning when they are articulated as (or pre-
sented as a) part of  a deliberative process in a second phase of  the ex-
periment. Does it follow that a justification does not count as reasoning 
when the task simply asks a participant to provide one, as they are in the 
first phase of  the Trouche et al. (2015) experiment? If  reasoning indeed 
arises when a participant puts her requested explanation down on paper 
(or screen), we are back to the situation that reasoning researchers have 
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been avoiding for decades because internal justifications are considered 
unreliable sources of  information  
Concerns about operationalizing justifications can be otherwise 
seen in the base-rate paper mentioned earlier from Obrecht & Chesny 
(2016). In that paper, “deliberation” is considered a factor when a condi-
tion presents a fictional character who presents an argument supporting 
the importance of  base-rate information (in one condition) or of  stereo-
typing information (in another) by adding a line of  “explanation”. This 
prompts two questions. First, does an explanation count as such because 
the task refers to someone who presents useful (or perhaps unuseful) infor-
mation? To put it another way, would it no longer be a deliberative pro-
cess if task instructions (which are essentially the words of an anonymous 
experimenter) provide an explanation? Is the providing of an interlocu-
tor the crux of a deliberation manipulation? This leads to the second 
question, which is, “what counts as an explanation or argument in a rea-
soning experiment?” Does an explanation that merely reminds partici-
pants about a feature of the task count as an argument? That is 
essentially what is done in the Obrecht & Chesny paper. What if an ex-
planation indirectly prompts a more normative resolution? In Baratgin & 
Noveck (2000), for example, we asked participants to rate the likelihood 
of whether a personality description corresponded with a Math teacher 
or a French literature teacher and we added cues to complementarity. Along 
with a standard control condition, we had one experimental condition in 
which we asked participants to provide two likelihood percentages per 
personality description –– one for a judgement about the likelihood that 
the personality is a Math teacher and another for French literature teach-
er; in a second experimental condition we wrote “Please note that the 
sum of the two percentages must be 100%. For example, Anne is either 
a mathematics teacher or a French literature teacher”. Each set of  cues 
led to progressively higher rates of  normative performance. Assuming 
we would get the same (or even more normative) results by introducing 
an interlocutor who presents these cues, would such indirect cues count 
as explanations?  
I ask these questions so as to be clearer about what constitutes a 
deliberative process in a Reasoning experiment. As far as I can tell, the 
theory does not provide a researcher with the means to set up his or her 
own experiment that uses justifications as a variable. One experimenter’s 
(or one participant’s) justification is potentially another’s reflexive, dis-
missible causal theory. 
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Summary 
 
Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber’s Enigma of  Reason is refreshing. It 
gets the field of  Reasoning out of  an impasse brought on by dual sys-
tems accounts and it places reasoning more snugly and naturally in evo-
lutionary theory. It keeps biases (that are now well known and accepted) 
in a prominent place while reconciling them with the emergence of  
normative thinking that, it is argued, arises through deliberation. It also 
underlines for all researchers the extent to which reasoning is a social ac-
tivity. That said, I point out that the theory seems to throw the baby out 
with the bathwater when it portrays deductive inference-making as so 
low-level that it appears to ignore or downplay a swath of  data showing 
that logical inference-making occurs with a regularity that can be cap-
tured both behaviorally and neurologically (as well as among babies). I 
think it is premature to claim that logical inferences are produced incon-
spicuously and unassumingly side-by-side with perceptual inferences. 
Furthermore, for the theory to get traction, I argue that it would benefit 
future researchers if  the Argumentative Theory were to provide more 
specific predictions about the sort of  reasoning problems whose solu-
tion would benefit from deliberation. Similarly, it would help practition-
ers of  reasoning research if  the theory were clearer about what counts 
exactly as a justification at each level of  reasoning (from lower-order in-
tuitions to higher-order ones to reasoning). I suppose all this can be de-
liberated viva voce sometime soon. 
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